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(57) 	 ABSTRACT 
A method and system for redundancy management is pro-
vided for a distributed and recoverable digital control system. 
The method uses unique redundancy management techniques 
to achieve recovery and restoration of redundant elements to 
full operation in an asynchronous environment. The system 
includes a first computing unit comprising a pair of redundant 
computational lanes for generating redundant control com-
mands. One or more internal monitors detect data errors in the 
control commands, and provide a recovery trigger to the first 
computing unit. A second redundant computing unit provides 
the same features as the first computing unit. A first actuator 
control unit is configured to provide blending and monitoring 
of the control commands from the first and second computing 
units, and to provide a recovery trigger to each of the first and 
second computing units. A second actuator control unit pro-
vides the same features as the first actuator control unit. 
18 Claims, 4 Drawing Sheets 
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METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR REDUNDANCY 	 with three processing units, for example, if one processor is 
MANAGEMENT OF DISTRIBUTED AND 
	
determined to be experiencing a fault, that processor may be 
RECOVERABLE DIGITAL CONTROL 
	 isolated and/or shut down. The fault may be corrected by 
SYSTEM 	 correct data (such as the current values of various control state 
5 variables) being transmitted (or "transfused") from the 
This application claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Pro- 	 remaining processors to the isolated unit. If the faults in the 
visional Application No. 60/705,843, filed on Aug. 5, 2005, 	 isolated unit are corrected, the processing unit may be re- 
which is incorporated herein by reference. The present appli- 	 introduced to the computing system along with the other two 
cation is related to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/381, 	 processing units. 
608, filed May 4, 2006, and to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10 	 Dissimilar computational redundancy is used to prevent 
11/381,637, filed May 4, 2006, both of which are incorpo- 	 the introduction of generic faults in control system architec- 
rated herein by reference. 	 tures. Generic faults refer to common errors in system redun- 
The U.S. Government may have certain rights in the 	 dancies. Such errors can occur in the design and development 
present invention as provided for by the terms of Contract No. 	 of the hardware and software elements within general pur- 
CRA NCC-1-393 with NASA. 	 15 pose computers that are used in control system architectures. 
As such, dissimilar computational redundancy would entail 
BACKGROUND TECHNOLOGY 	 each redundant hardware element using a dissimilar micro- 
processor and each redundant microprocessor executing soft- 
Computers have been used in digital control systems in a 	 ware (e.g., operating system, application, etc.) that was devel- 
variety of applications, such as in industrial, aerospace, medi-  20 oped using a different programming language. 
cal, scientific research, and other fields. In such control sys- 	 Other methods that have been used to help ensure the 
tems, it is important to maintain the integrity of the data 	 continued operation of control systems include the use of 
produced by a computer. In conventional control systems, a 	 dissimilar technology, distributed computation redundancy, 
computing unit for a plant is typically designed such that the 	 equalization, and mid-value voting. Each of these methods, 
resulting closed loop system exhibits stability, low-frequency 25 however, generally requires at least one processing unit to 
command tracking, low-frequency disturbance rejection, and 	 remain operational at all times to preserve state variables. 
high-frequency noise attenuation. The "plant" can be any 	 While the control systems may remain operational if all but 
object, process, or other parameter capable of being con- 	 one of the processing units experience a soft fault and the 
trolled, such as an aircraft, spacecraft, medical equipment, 	 correctly-operating unit can be identified, the control system 
electrical power generation, industrial automation, valve, 30 will not operate properly if all of the processors simulta- 
boiler, actuator, or other device. A control effector is used to 	 neously experience soft faults. Similarly, if a lone properly- 
provoke a response by the plant. For example, when the plant 	 operating unit cannot be identified within the system, the 
is an aircraft, control effectors may be in the form of flight 	 system will not recover, as there would be no identifiable 
control surfaces such as rudders, ailerons, and/or elevators. 	 operating unit with correct values for all of the state variables 
Various types of failures or faults may be encountered by 35 to be transfused to the remaining units. In addition, because of 
conventional computing units found in control systems. A 	 the transfusion of state variables from other processing units, 
"hard fault" is a fault condition typically caused by a penna- 	 the system recovery may be relatively slow. It may therefore 
nent failure of the analog or digital circuitry. For digital cir- 	 take an extended period of time for all processing units within 
cuitry, a "soft fault" is typically caused by transient phenom- 	 the system to resume normal operation. In the meantime, 
ena that may affect some digital circuit computing elements 4o redundant control is undesirably lost or degraded. 
resulting in computation disruption, but does not permanently 	 In the aerospace field, digital flight control systems are 
damage or alter the subsequent operation of the circuitry. 	 frequently interposed between the pilot and the flight control 
Soft faults maybe caused by electromagnetic fields created 	 surfaces of an aircraft. Such systems may include fly-by-wire, 
by high-frequency signals propagating through the comput- 	 auto-pilot, and auto-land systems. In a fly-by-wire system, in 
ing system. Soft faults may also result from spurious intense 45 lieu of pilot controls being mechanically coupled (e.g., via 
electromagnetic signals, such as those caused by lightning 	 cables or hydraulics) to the various primary flight control 
that induce electrical transients on system lines and data buses 	 surfaces of the aircraft (such as the ailerons, elevators, and 
which propagate to internal digital circuitry setting latches 	 rudder), the position and movements of a pilot's controls are 
into erroneous states. In addition to lightning, other elements 	 electronically read by sensors and transmitted to a computing 
of the electromagnetic environment (EME) such as high- 50 system. The computing system typically sends electronic 
intensity radiated fields (HIRE), radio communications, radar 	 control signals to actuators of various types that are coupled 
pulses, and the intense fields associated with electromagnetic 	 to the primary flight control surfaces of the aircraft. The 
pulses (EMP) may also cause soft faults. Further, high-energy 	 actuators are typically configured to move one or more con- 
atomic particles from a variety of sources (e.g., atmospheric 	 trol surfaces according to inputs provided by the pilot, or in 
neutrons, cosmic radiation, weapon detonation, etc.) may 55 response to feedback measured by a sensor on the aircraft. 
deposit sufficient energy in the bulk semiconductor material 
	
Failure of the control system could thus have catastrophic 
of a digital device to set electronic circuits into erroneous 	 effects on the aircraft. Similarly, industrial, medical, or other 
states. With the advent of smaller integrated circuits running 	 systems may be gravely affected by certain control system 
at high speeds, soft faults are becoming more common such 
	
failures. 
as in the radiation environment encountered by aircraft trav-  60 	 In conventional flight control system (FCS) architectures, 
eling at high altitudes. In such an environment, computing 	 recovery from soft faults of FCS architectural elements, par- 
circuits containing state-of-the-art digital devices may be 	 ticularly in the flight control computer, is either not possible, 
more susceptible to failure. 	 has to resort to recovery attempts after a grace period of time, 
In conventional control systems, various forms of redun- 	 or requires recycling of power such as rebooting the com- 
dancy have been used in an attempt to reduce the effects of 65 puter. Any of these circumstances can impact the mean time 
faults in critical systems. Multiple processing units, for 	 between unscheduled removals (MTBUR) negatively. In 
example, may be used within a computing system. In a system 	 addition, tight tolerance monitoring has been dependant on 
US 8,260,492 B2 
3 
synchronous operations for tight tracking of redundant ele-
ments, and has been relatively federated and not easily scale-
able. 
High integrity digital flight control systems usually require 
incorporation of redundant elements to achieve required reli-
ability. Management of systems to provide maximum theo-
retically possible availability of the redundant elements in the 
presence of soft faults is difficult to achieve without requiring 
close synchronization of the computing elements or other 
technically difficult monitoring mechanisms. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Features of the present invention will become apparent to 
those skilled in the art from the following description with 
reference to the drawings. Understanding that the drawings 
depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are not 
therefore to be considered limiting in scope, the invention will 
be described with additional specificity and detail through the 
use of the accompanying drawings, in which: 
FIG. 1 is a schematic depiction of a digital control system 
that can employ the redundancy management features of the 
invention; 
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a soft fault rapid recovery 
system that can be used in the digital control system of FIG. 
1; 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a command and recovery 
management system that can be used in the digital control 
system of FIG. 1; and 
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a time magnitude monitoring 
method that can be used as part of the redundancy manage-
ment method of the invention. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The present invention relates to a method and system for 
redundancy management of a distributed and recoverable 
digital control system. This invention uses unique redun-
dancy management techniques to achieve recovery and res-
toration of redundant elements to full operation in an asyn-
chronous environment. Utilizing recoverable computing 
elements and redundancy management that accommodates 
recovery of redundant elements ensures maximum availabil-
ity of system resources in the presence of soft faults. The 
redundancy management functions are distributed through-
out the architecture of the control system. 
In the following description, various embodiments of the 
present invention may be described herein in terms of various 
architecture elements and processing steps. It should be 
appreciated that such elements may be realized by any num-
ber of hardware or structural components configured to per-
form specified operations. For purposes of illustration only, 
exemplary embodiments of the present invention will fre-
quently be described herein in connection with aircraft avi-
onics. The invention is not so limited, however, and the con-
cepts and devices disclosed herein may be used in any control 
environment. Further, it should be noted that although various 
components may be coupled or connected to other compo-
nents within exemplary system architectures, such connec-
tions and couplings can be realized by direct connection 
between components, or by connection though other compo-
nents and devices located therebetween. The following 
detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting 
sense. 
According to various exemplary embodiments of the 
invention, a control system architecture suitably includes suf-
ficient computation redundancy and control command man- 
4 
agement to either isolate and recover a faulted processor, or to 
recover all processing units of the redundant system without 
adverse effects. Computational redundancy may be provided 
with multiple processors or processing units within a com- 
5 puter or computing platform. In addition to isolating and 
recovering from internal faults, various embodiments allow 
processing units to detect faults in other system elements such 
as sensors, adaptors, actuators and/or effectors. Further 
embodiments may also include one or more actuator adaptor 
io units, that through the detection of adverse data errors, detect 
faults in other system components (that are in addition to the 
processing units) and issue discrete instructions to trigger a 
recovery. 
An exemplary control system architecture suitably 
15 includes multiple processors, each of which is configured for 
rapid recovery from various faults. The term "rapid recovery" 
indicates that recovery may occur in a very short amount of 
time. To maintain the operation of a control system, it is 
generally desirable that a recovery from a soft fault takes 
20 place within about I to 2 computing frames. As used herein, 
a "computing frame" is the time needed for a particular pro-
cessing unit to perform a repetitive task of a computation, 
e.g., the tasks that need to be calculated continuously to 
maintain the operation of the controlled plant. In some 
25 embodiments, processor recovery is performed within about 
I computing frame and redundancy recovery is performed 
within about I or 2 computing frames, or otherwise in a short 
enough time period so as to have only minimal effects, if any, 
on system performance. 
30 	 The ability of a processor to initiate recovery from a soft 
fault allows various embodiments of the present invention to 
aid in the recovery of the system as a whole. In addition, soft 
faults may be detected in the same computing frame or within 
several frames in which the faults occur. In embodiments 
35 wherein faults are detected within a single computing frame, 
eachprocessor need only store control and logic state variable 
data for the immediately preceding frame for use in recovery 
purposes, which may take place essentially instantaneously. 
Accordingly, the dependence of each component upon other 
4o redundant components is suitably reduced. 
Instructions for carrying out the various methods, process 
tasks, calculations, control functions, and the generation of 
signals and other data used in the operation of the system of 
the invention are implemented, in some embodiments, in 
45 software programs, firmware, or computer readable instruc-
tions. These instructions are typically stored on any appropri-
ate computer readable medium used for storage of computer 
readable instructions or data structures. Such computer read-
able media can be any available media that can be accessed by 
5o a general purpose or special purpose computer or processor, 
or any programmable logic device. 
By way of example, and not limitation, such computer 
readable media can include floppy disks, hard disks, ROM, 
flash memory ROM, nonvolatile ROM, EEPROM, RAM, 
55 CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, or other optical disk storage, mag-
netic disk storage, or other magnetic storage devices, or any 
other medium that can be used to carry or store desired pro-
gram code means in the form of computer executable instruc-
tions or data structures. When information is transferred or 
60 provided over a network or another communications connec-
tion (either hardwired, wireless, or a combination of hard-
wired orwireless) to a computer, the computer properly views 
the connection as a computer readable medium. Thus, any 
such connection is properly termed a computer readable 
65 medium. Combinations of the above are also included within 
the scope of computer readable media. Computer executable 
instructions comprise, for example, instructions and data 
US 8,260,492 B2 
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which cause a general purpose computer, special purpose 	 recovery trigger of each monitored application. The ACUs 
computer, or special purpose processing device to perform a 	 can also be redundant per control axis. Although control 
certain function or group of functions. 	 system 100 is shown with four ACUs, a varying number of 
The system of the invention will also be described in the 	 ACUs can be employed depending upon system require- 
general context of computer readable instructions, such as 5 ments. For example, in some embodiments three or more 
program modules, being executed by a processor. Generally, 	 ACUs can be employed in a control system according to the 
program modules include routines, programs, objects, data 	 invention. 
components, data structures, algorithms, etc. that perform 	 Each ACU 116, 118, 120, and 122 is also in operative 
particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. 	 communication with a respective one of a smart actuator 124, 
Computer executable instructions, associated data structures, io 126, 128, and 130. An actuator is made "smart" when an 
and program modules represent examples of a program code 	 electronics module such as an electronic interface unit (EIU) 
means for executing steps of the methods disclosed herein. 	 is added to the basic actuator. The smart actuators used in the 
The particular sequence of such executable instructions or 	 control system can be dual-channel, fail-passive, electrome- 
associated data structures represents examples of correspond- 	 chanical actuators, which contain two independent computa- 
ing acts for implementing the functions described in such 15 tional lanes. The smart actuators receive actuator position 
steps. 	 command signals from the ACUs. The smart actuators also 
In one embodiment, the present invention provides a 	 determine validity of commands from the computing unit 
redundancy management method for the architectural ele- 	 based on command validity flags and activity monitoring. The 
ments of a control system such as a primary flight control 	 smart actuators 124, 126, 128, and 130 are configured to 
system where some elements can rapidly recover from soft 20 provide feedback to the respective ACU 116, 118, 120, and 
faults. This method manages redundant commands, 	 122 related to actuator position information. 
responses, and recoveries; uses the status from independent 	 The smart actuators 124,126, 128, and 130 can optionally 
hardware monitors internal and external to a computing unit 	 be in operative communication with a respective servo or 
such as a flight control computer (FCC); and uses command 	 actuator device such as hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, and 
blending and equalization provided by complementary archi-  25 138. The hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, and 138 can be 
tecture elements comprised of high-integrity self-checking 	 respectively coupled to various control effectors 140, 141, 
pairs of computing lanes within each computing unit and an 	 142, and 143 such as, for example, various primary flight 
actuator control unit (ACU). The ACU may by implemented 	 control surfaces of an aircraft (e.g., rudders, ailerons, and/or 
in hardware or software or a combination of both. The ACU 	 elevators). The control effectors 140-143 are configured to 
performs fault isolation by comparing the commands to the 30 provide feedback to the respective ACU 116, 118, 120, and 
blended value from all inputs. The equalization makes it 	 122 related to effector position information. 
possible to hold the comparison to a tight threshold in the 	 As depicted in FIG. 1, the computing units 112 and 114 
monitor. The ACU isolates the faulted output and can com- 	 receive data inputs from sensor sets 150,152, and 154, which 
mand recovery of a computing lane from a soft fault. Recov- 	 can include air data, inertial data, or commands from an 
ery can also be commanded by a computing unit of the control 35 operator (e.g., pilot controls, etc.). The sensor sets can include 
system based on a failure of a computing unit internal moni- 	 any number of gyroscopes, vehicle position sensors, airflow 
tor. 	 sensors, temperature sensors, and/or other sensing devices as 
Referring now to FIG. 1, an exemplary scaleable architec- 	 may be appropriate for the particular implementation. A data 
ture of a digital control system 100 that can employ the 	 concentrator 156, 158, and 160 with a single lane can be 
redundancy management functions of the invention includes 40 implemented between each sensor set 150, 152, 154 and 
a first computing unit 112 and a second computing unit 114. 	 computing units 112 and 114. The data concentrators suitably 
The computing units 112 and 114 can be any digital control 	 receive and concentrate data from the sensors to provide an 
device such as a digital computer or processor, and provide 	 interface to computing units 112 and 114 as appropriate. The 
for redundancy in processing. Each computing unit 112, 114 
	
data concentrators may also provide sensor validity monitor- 
suitably includes one or more processing devices capable of 45 ing to ensure that the sensors remain active. Each of the 
executing multiple and/or simultaneous software processes. 	 sensors may optionally include rapid recovery elements if 
As shown, the computing units 112 and 114 can include 	 available and desired for the particular implementation. 
real-time multi-tasking computing platforms such as a pri- 	 The control system 100 can be suitably implemented, for 
mary flight control computer (PFCC). The PFCC can be an 	 example, as part of a digital flight control system to provide 
integrated modular computing platform (IMCP) with dual 50 functions for the safe flight and landing of aerospace vehicles. 
computing lanes. 	 The control system 100 provides for independent recovery of 
The computing units 112 and 114 provide input process- 	 any computing lane, and all system elements can be executed 
ing, sensor selection, control laws (e.g., pitch, yaw, and roll 	 asynchronously. Also, control system 100 can accommodate 
inner loops), monitoring (e.g., actuator and effector monitor- 	 the asynchronous operation of dissimilar computational 
ing), equalization, rapid recovery, redundancy management, 55 redundancy. For example, the PFCC performs equalization of 
and any appropriate recovery triggers. Although control sys- 	 surface positions by bringing diverging data back to the same 
tem 100 is shown with two computing units, additional com- 	 value or close to the same value. An actuator command man- 
puting units can be employed if desired. 	 agement voting algorithm accommodates asynchronous sur- 
Each of the computing units 112 and 114 are in operative 	 face command inputs such that the PFCC, ACU, and other 
communication with a multitude of actuator control units 60 elements can execute asynchronously, and can accommodate 
(ACUs) 116, 118, 120, and 122, which provide for actuator 	 computational lanes using dissimilar computational redun- 
command (Cmd) management and have dual computing 	 dancy. 
lanes. The ACUs perform command blending and selection, 	 The computing platform such as the PFCC provides a 
and use other redundant actuator command values while a 	 real-time multi-tasking computer system with rollback recov- 
computing platform such as a PFCC lane is recovering. The 65 cry capability. The PFCC enables integration of functions, 
ACUs also perform monitoring of actuator command lanes, 	 and applications may selectively use the recovery function as 
data concentration, and initiation of a selective and isolated 	 required. The recovery mechanism operation can be verifi- 
US 8,260,492 B2 
7 
	
8 
able using common built-in-test methods, which can be used 	 recovery system 200 allows the recovered CPU to start in a 
to verify operation of the recovery mechanism at any time. 	 time frame near to the time frame of the other CPUs in the 
The PFCC can also provide monitoring of ACU surface com- 	 system since no reboot of the system is necessary. 
mands and surface positions. 	 A suitable related fault recovery system that can be used in 
During operation of control system 100, computing units 5 the control system of the present invention is disclosed in 
112,114 receive input from sensor sets 150,152,154 via data 	 copending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/058,764 filed 
concentrators 156, 158, 160. Each computing unit provides 	 on Feb. 16, 2005, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
the appropriate data to each computational lane thereof, 	 During a rapid recovery cycle, the tolerance used in an 
which operate as separate partitioned processing units. 	 ACU to determine if a processing unit is operating properly 
Accordingly, each data set from redundant sensor and com-  io may be relaxed for that particular processing unit. For 
mand data sets can be simultaneously processed in multiple 	 example, during normal operation, there may be a predeter- 
isolated processing units. The commands signals from each 	 mined tolerance, within which each of the processing units is 
lane of computing units 112, 114 propagate to each of the 	 expected to operate. If a processing unit produces values that 
ACUs 116, 118, 120, and 122. The ACUs transmit the com- 	 are not within the predetermined tolerance, that processing 
mand signals to the smart actuators 124, 126, 128, and 130, 15 unit may be determined to be suffering from a soft fault, and 
which then perform the requested commands as appropriate 	 a rapid recovery cycle may be initiated. During the rapid 
to control the hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, 138, and 	 recovery cycle, the predetermined tolerance for the affected 
thereby the control effectors 140-143. During normal opera- 	 processing unit may be initially widened and then narrowed 
tion, the output signals from each processing unit can be 	 over a predetermined time period such that further deviations 
monitored internally, or externally by the ACUs, to ensure 20 are acceptable until the processing unit resumes normal 
that each of the computing units 112, 114 are producing 	 operation. 
results within a predetermined tolerance of the remaining 	 Furthermore, the output of the processing unit may not be 
computing units. 	 included in the derivation of the output from the ACU (e.g., 
Each processing unit of computing units 112, 114 is con- 	 computation of the mid-value) until the output comes within 
figured to be capable of rapid recovery from soft faults. To 25 the relaxed tolerance. If the output comes within tolerance 
accomplish rapid recovery, each processing unit is configured 
	 (indicating that the computing unit has stabilized) within a 
to retrieve control and logic state variable data from internal 	 predetermined period of time, it may once again be included 
memory locations such as a high integrity random access 	 in the output derivation. Before the predetermined time has 
memory. Using the retrieved state variables and appropriate 	 expired and the processing unit output has come within tol- 
sensor data, each processing unit can fully recover from a soft 30 erance, requests for placing the processing unit into a rapid 
fault relatively quickly without requiring a data transfusion 	 recovery state may be suspended or "masked" to allow the 
from another computing unit. The rapid recovery cycle 	 processing unit to recover. Once the processing unit has sta- 
involves halting processor execution, instating state variables 	 bilized from the recovery cycle, it may be subjected to the 
from a protected memory area, and starting execution again at 	 previous tolerances. If the output does not come within tol- 
an appropriate location in the program execution cycle. 35 erance within the predetermined time, another request to 
Through the use of command blending, equalization, or other 	 place the processing unit into a rapid recovery state may be 
techniques, it is not necessary to synchronize with the remain- 	 issued. 
ing processing units after initiating the rapid recovery cycle. 	 In general, if the output of a recovered element falls outside 
For example, FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a soft fault rapid 	 of the relaxed tolerance following recovery, that computa- 
recovery system 200 that can be used in the digital control 40 tional element is kept off-line until the system is restarted 
system of the invention. The recovery system 200 is imple- 	 (i.e., re-powered). Such a failure indicates that the recovery 
mented internally in each computing platform such as com- 	 was unsuccessful. While rare, this provides a means for 
puting units 112 and 114 of control system 100 in FIG. 1. As 	 excluding a computational element that does not return to the 
shown in FIG. 2, a monitor 210 is provided that is in operative 	 tolerance within a specified time period. The tolerance used 
communication with a central processing unit (CPU) 220 and 45 following recovery is tightened over a specific time period 
a CPU 222. A memory unit 224 operatively communicates 	 until it reaches the original tolerance. 
with CPU 220, and another memory unit 226 operatively 	 One technique for computing the blended control output 
communicates with CPU 222. Protected storage areas can be 	 involves computing a "mid-value" in which the signals from 
provided to store state variable data 250, 252. The protected 	 a processing unit are used to compute a mean and/or median 
storage areas can include high integrity memory cells such as 50 of all of the values produced. This mid-valve is then compared 
disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,163,480, which is incorporated 	 to each signal from each of the processing units in the system. 
herein by reference. 	 If a discrepancy exists between any particular value produced 
During operation of recovery system 200, state variable 	 by any lane and the mean and/or median of all the values (i.e., 
data 250,252 generated by CPU 220 and CPU 222 is stored in 	 the mid-values), an error condition is detected and the appro- 
memory units 224 and 226, respectively. The state variable 55 priate processing unit is commanded to initiate a rapid recov- 
data is related to the state the CPU operates under for a given 	 ery cycle. The discrepancy from the mid-values may be based 
set of inputs and outputs. This data includes states generated 	 upon any tolerance value, which can in turn be adjusted based 
by the computing hardware as well as states generated by the 	 upon desired conditions. The detection of discrepancy from a 
application software. The data is stored with respect to a given 	 mean or median value can be processed very rapidly, thus 
computing frame N several frames back in time (N-1, N-2,. 60 potentially resulting in an identification of an error within one 
.. N—X) in the protected storage areas. If the CPU or a 	 or two computational frames of the value being produced. 
memory element is upset to generate a soft fault, such as by 	 Accordingly, differences from mid-values may be computed 
interference from an EME signal, monitor 210 rapidly detects 	 based uponprevious mid-values (i.e., values maintained from 
the soft fault and causes a recovery trigger 260 to initiate. This 	 a previous frame), or can be computed in real time as appro- 
restores the state variable data saved from one of the previous 65 priate. 
computing frames and restarts the upset CPU with the most 	 Alternatively, when one or more of the ACUs 116, 118, 
recent good data at the next starting computing frame. The 	 120, 122 sense that one of the computing units 112, 114 are 
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not supplying signals that lie within certain tolerances, the 	 computing unit 350. Redundancy is provided by the external 
ACUs may transmit a signal to the computing unit in question 	 recovery triggers since each of the ACUs can initiate com- 
to request the start of a rapid recovery cycle for a particular 	 puter recovery, because the ACUs calculate a voted value 
processing unit. 	 independently. 
The computing units of the control system are configured 5 	 During operation of redundancy management method 
to perform redundancy management actions such as equal- 	 employed in management system 300, a command signal lfis 
ization, in which the control signal generated by each pro- 	 sent from computer la to ACU 320 and ACU 360. If either 
ces sing unit is driven toward fine adjustments in the computed 	 ACU detects an errant command (for instance an errant com- 
mid-value, so that the signals produced by each processing 	 mand caused by a soft fault), external recovery triggers le or 
unit result in an equalized control command. Such implemen-  io (Ne) can be initiated for computer la recovery. Likewise, a 
tations typically do not require tight synchronization between 	 command signal (Nf) from computer (Na) is sent to ACU 360 
the various processing units to achieve "equalized" command 	 and ACU 320, which can initiate external recovery triggers 
values because each command signal is driven toward the 	 (Ne) and le, respectively, for soft fault recovery of computer 
other signals (i.e., toward a mid-value). 	 (Na). The internal monitors lb and (Nb) can also initiate 
An equalization signal is derived from feedback of control 15 recovery of computers la and (Na) through internal recovery 
effector positions and is used to cancel out drift in the surface 	 triggers lc and (Nc), respectively. If an ACU or the internal 
commands, preventing divergence of computed surface com- 	 monitors sense a hard fault (i.e., an unrecoverable fault), then 
mands. This allows tight monitoring and comparison of the 	 the appropriate computing unit may be shut down or isolated 
command signals in the ACU and the rapid detection of 	 as appropriate. 
computing element errors in time to command recovery 20 	 Sensor, actuator, control effector, and time magnitude 
before state variable values are permanently lost. 	 monitoring support the redundancy management method of 
Use of the equalization method allows asynchronism of the 	 the invention. Sensor source selection is performed based on 
control computation elements so that the implementation of 
	
data freshness and reasonableness monitoring. In time mag- 
the elements may be either similar or dissimilar as called for 	 nitude monitoring, an ACU blended command output is com- 
in order to meet reliability and availability requirements. For 25 pared against the computed effector command for each con- 
example, different types of processors may be employed in 	 trol axis and deviations beyond an established limit for the 
the computing units if desired. The equalization scheme also 	 specified time are reported for further redundancy manage- 
accommodates errant effector positions 	 ment action. In this redundancy management method, the 
By implementing command blending and equalization, 	 smart actuators are commanded to ignore or disregard the 
rapid recovery of redundant elements is provided for in a so ACU commands when the deviations are beyond the estab-
transparent, seamless way. That is, any data errors in any 	 lished limit. 
processing unit do not propagate through the system to 	 The actuator position feedback is also checked against a 
adversely affect the control function. If one processing unit 	 selected ACU blended command. A failure of the actuator is 
encounters a soft fault and proceeds to a recovery cycle, the 	 reported if checks of the actuator position feedback versus the 
remaining operating processing units are unaffected by the 35 ACU blended command exceeds a prescribed limit for the 
recovery cycle and the operation of the control system as a 	 specified time. In this redundancy management method, 
whole is unaffected. 	 actuators are commanded to restart if checks of a control 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a command and recovery 	 effector (e.g., aileron, elevator, etc.) position feedback against 
management system 300 that illustrates a portion of the 	 the ACU blended command exceed a prescribed limit for the 
redundancy management system of the invention used with a 40 specified time. In this redundancy management method, the 
digital control system. As shown, management system 300 is 	 actuators are commanded to shutdown if restarting fails to 
scalable to any number of redundant computing units with 	 correct the position error. By employing these comparison 
internal monitors that operatively communicate with a 	 functions it is possible to determine where a fault is located. 
respective actuator control manager of an ACU that provides 	 FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary time magnitude 
an external monitor for the computing units. This allows for 45 monitoring method such as described above that can be used 
ease in adding extra redundancy to the control system, adding 	 to support the redundancy management methodology of the 
extra control effectors, and adding extra control functions. 	 invention. A processing unit of the control system performs a 
As depicted in FIG. 3, a computing unit 310 such as a 	 control law computation 410 and sends a computed surface 
PFCC includes a processor or computer la with recovery 	 command to a compare module 420 for comparison with an 
available, and an internal monitor lb that provides a recovery 5o ACU(1) voted actuator command. In this redundancy man- 
trigger lc for computer la. The computing unit 310 is in 	 agement method, a smart actuator is commanded to ignore the 
operative communication with an ACU 320 having an actua- 	 ACU(1) voted actuator command when deviations between 
tor control manager ld that provides mid-value voting and 	 theACU(1) voted command output and the computed surface 
monitoring of command lanes. An external recovery trigger 	 command are beyond an established limit for a specified time 
le is provided such that ACU 320 can initiate the recovery of 55 424. The ACU voted actuator commands for ACU(1), ACU 
computing unit 310. A redundant computing unit 350 
	 (2) ... ACU(n) are sent to a select module 430, and the 
includes a processor or computer (Na) and an internal moni- 	 selected command is sent to a compare module 440 for com- 
tor (Nb) that provides a recovery trigger (Nc) for computer 	 parison with an actuator surface position feedback signal. 
(Na). The computing unit 350 is in operative communication 	 When deviations between the selected voted actuator com- 
with an ACU 360 having an actuator control manager (Nd) bo mand output andthe actuator surface position feedback signal 
that provides mid-value voting and monitoring of command 	 exceed an established limit for a specified time 450, the actua- 
lanes. An external recovery trigger Ne is also provided. 	 tor is commanded to shutdown in this redundancy manage- 
The computing unit 310 is also in operative communica- 	 ment methodology. 
tion with ACU 360, which provides a redundant external 
	
Various redundancy management actions can be per- 
recovery trigger (Ne) to computing unit 310. Likewise, com-  65 formed by an ACU, such as validating redundant control 
puting unit 350 is in operative communication withACU 320, 	 effector commands from computing units such as FCCs, per- 
which provides a redundant external recovery trigger le to 	 forming mid-value voting of redundant control effector com- 
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mands, and commanding recovery of any computing unit that 	 recovered, such a recovery would occur before an aircraft 
exceeds an error threshold. The ACUs exclude from the vot- 	 effect would be produced. The additional layers of actuator 
ing surface commands a recovering computing unit during a 	 command processing within the control system assures that 
specified recovery period (i.e., grace period), and perma- 	 no aircraft effect is produced during and after recovery. By 
nently exclude surface commands from a computing unit that 5 employing recovery management of redundant elements dur- 
fails to recover during a specified time interval. An ACU 
	
ing/after FCC recovery from soft faults, the actuator com- 
detects attempts of other ACUs to control the same actuator, 	 mand management can use other redundant actuator com- 
stops attempting to control the same actuator as anotherACU, 	 mand values while the FCC is recovering. 
and attempts to establish control of an actuator that is not 	 In order not to mask hard faults when soft fault recovery is 
being driven by any other ACU. The ACU also reports actua-  io part of a computing environment implementing a flight con- 
tor status to a computing unit to allow fault isolation actions 	 trol function, some form of monitoring for number of recov- 
by the computing unit. 	 eries should be provided. Along with keeping track of the 
Redundancy management actions are also performed by 	 number of recoveries, monitoring criteria should, at a mini- 
the smart actuators, such as validating all incoming ACU 	 mum, limit the time in which some maximum number of 
command messages, and positioning an output drum only in 15 recoveries are allowed for systems that are flight critical, 
response to identical valid commands on both input channels. 	 particularly flight control systems. The multiple redundant 
The smart actuators also respond to an ACU with a status 	 elements in the control system provide hard fault manage- 
message each time dual valid command messages are 	 ment/containment. Using distributed redundancy manage- 
received, and disengage when invalid or no valid command 	 ment ensures that a recurring FCC fault is eventually treated 
message is received for the timeout period. 	 20 as a hard fault since a hard fault or failure is not inadvertently 
The redundancy management method and system of the 	 masked by recovery. For example, a recovery retry counter 
invention have the following characteristics that allow rapid 	 can be used to ensure that a recurring FCC fault is eventually 
recovery of redundant elements of the control system. The 	 treated as a hard failure. The FCC will be taken off-line if 
recovery of a computational element is selective depending 	 excessive recovery retries occur in too short of a time. 
upon which computation is in error. Successfully recovered 25 	 The present invention may be embodied in other specific 
computational elements are allowed to be gracefully restored 
	
forms without departing from its essential characteristics. 
to the original system configuration. In order to allow an 	 The described embodiments and methods are to be consid- 
element to recover and gracefully re-enter the system, moni- 	 ered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The 
tors (both internal and external) adjust upon detection of a 	 scope of the invention is therefore indicated by the appended 
recovery to not lockout an element until it has had a chance to so claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changes 
recover. Management of redundant elements both during and 	 that come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the 
after recovery of a computational element from soft faults is 	 claims are to be embraced within their scope. 
provided. 	 What is claimed is: 
Hard failures are not masked by the recovery and redun- 	 1. A method for redundancy management comprising: 
dancy management methods. Recovery counters and timeout 35 	 providing a plurality of computing units each comprising: 
monitors ensure that if recoveries are not successful, faulted 	 a plurality of redundant processing units for generating 
elements are permanently locked out from further operation. 	 one or more redundant control commands; and 
Further, the redundancy management functions are distrib- 	 one or more internal monitors for detecting one or more 
uted throughout the control system so that multiple elements 	 data errors in the control commands; 
can be in recovery at any one time. 	 40 	 providing a plurality of actuator control units having a pair 
Recovery trigger outputs are distributed among redundant 	 of redundant computational lanes for analyzing control 
elements in the control system. Multiple external recovery 	 commands and providing feedback to the processing 
triggers to a computing platform element within one compu- 	 units; and 
tational frame time are managed to initiate only a single 	 initiating a selective and isolated recovery of one or more 
recovery action in that element. The redundancy management 45 	 monitored applications in a processing unit of the plu- 
system is scalable in that there is no dependency in the sort- 	 rality of processing units while one or more other appli- 
ing, voting, or monitoring algorithms that would exclude a 	 cations remain undisturbed in the processing unit when: 
greater number of computational elements from being man- 	 one or more data errors are detected in the one or more 
aged. 	 monitored applications by one or more of the internal 
When the redundancy management functions are imple-  50 	 monitors; or 
mented as part of a digital control system used in the context 	 one or more data errors are detected in the one or more 
of aerospace flight control, the control system performs the 	 monitored applications by one or more of the actuator 
safety functions necessary for safe flight and landing of air- 	 control units; 
craft. The control system architecture maintains a pilot con- 	 wherein the recovery restores the most recent error-free 
nection to control surfaces at all times such that the pilot has 55 	 congruent set of state data for any one or more of the 
the last action. The recovery management provided by the 	 selected applications simultaneously. 
control system does not compromise aircraft stability, and 
	
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
recovery management ensures that fault events and recoveries 	 computing a blended command for one or more of the 
are transparent to aircraft function. 	 control commands; and 
The control system architecture also supports multiple 60 	 initiating recovery in one or more of the applications when 
recoveries of redundant flight control elements from multiple 	 the difference between a control command generated by 
monitors in real time. This is provided by using multiple 	 a processing unit and the blended command exceeds a 
redundant ACUs per control axis and multiple redundant 	 threshold value. 
external recovery paths. The recovery management of the 	 3. The method of claim 2, further comprising: 
control system does not compromise aircraft stability, since 65 	 excluding from the blended command a processing unit 
recovery of each computing lane occurs before an aircraft 	 command for a recovering application for a specified 
effect is produced. Even if all computing lanes needed to be 	 recovery period; 
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wherein the recovering processing unit command is not 
permanently excluded from the blended command 
before the specified recovery period has expired, and 
wherein the recovering processing unit command is per-
manently excluded from the blended command when 
the recovering application fails to correctly recover dur-
ing the specified recovery period. 
4. The method of claim 2, further comprising: 
analyzing the control commands generated by each of the 
processing units; and 
adjusting the computed blended command so that the con-
trol commands generated by the processing units result 
in a substantially equalized control command. 
5. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
comparing a blended command output with a computed 
command; 
disregarding the blended command output when devia-
tions between the blended command output and the 
computed command exceed an established limit for a 
specified time; 
selecting a blended command output from a plurality of 
blended command outputs; 
comparing the selected blended command output with an 
actuator position feedback signal; and 
initiating an actuator shutdown command when deviations 
between the selected blended command output and the 
actuator position feedback signal exceed an established 
limit for a specified time. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the method is imple-
mented in redundancy management of a recoverable digital 
control system. 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the method is imple-
mented in redundancy management of a computing platform. 
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the method is imple-
mented in redundancy management of one or more actuator 
control units. 
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the method is imple-
mented in redundancy management of one or more smart 
actuators. 
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the method provides 
coordinated redundant control of actuators by the actuator 
control units. 
11. The method of claim 1, wherein the method validates 
and responds to each valid command from the actuator con-
trol units, and safely disengages an actuator when no valid 
command is received during an established limit for a speci-
fied time. 
12. The method of claim 6, wherein redundancy manage-
ment actions are distributed throughout the system so that 
multiple elements of the system can be in a recovery state at 
any one time. 
13. The method of claim 1, wherein redundancy manage-
ment actions support multiple recoveries of redundant ele-
ments from multiple monitors in real time. 
14 
14. The method of claim 1, further comprising duplicating 
state variable data stored in one or more memory devices in 
the computing units. 
15. The method of claim 6, further comprising restoring a 
5 duplicate set of state variable data when a soft fault is detected 
so that one or more processing units can resume processing 
using the duplicate set of state variable data. 
16. The method of claim 10, wherein at least one of the 
actuator control units detects attempts of other actuator con- 
ic trol units to control the same actuator, and stops attempting to 
control the same actuator as another actuator control unit, 
while attempting to establish control of an actuator that is not 
being driven by any other actuator control unit. 
17. The method of claim 10, wherein at least one of the 
actuator control units reports actuator status to a computing 
is unit to allow fault isolation actions by the computing unit. 
18. A method for redundancy management comprising: 
providing a plurality of computing units each comprising: 
a plurality of redundant processing units for generating 
one or more redundant control commands; and 
~~ 	 one or more internal monitors for detecting one or more 
data errors in the control commands; 
wherein the processing units each include a recovery 
mechanism, the recovery mechanism comprising: 
25 	 a duplicate memory; 
an even frame memory, wherein the recovery mecha-
nism is configured to duplicate state variables com-
puted during even computational frames into the 
even frame memory; and 
30 	 an odd frame memory, wherein the recovery mecha- 
nism is configured to duplicate state variables com-
puted during odd computational frames into the 
odd frame memory; 
wherein the even frame memory and the odd frame 
35 memory toggle back and forth duplicating state vari-
ables into the duplicate memory for computational 
frames in which no fault is detected; 
providing a plurality of actuator control units having a pair 
of redundant computational lanes for analyzing control 
40 	
commands and providing feedback to the processing 
units; and 
initiating a selective and isolated recovery of one or more 
monitored applications in a processing unit of the plu-
rality of processing units while one or more other appli-
cations remain undisturbed in the processing unit when: 45 	
one or more data errors are detected in the one or more 
monitored applications by one or more of the internal 
monitors; or 
one or more data errors are detected in the one or more 
50 	
monitored applications by one or more of the actuator 
control units; 
wherein the recovery mechanism creates and restores an 
error-free congruent set of state data for any of the one or 
more monitored applications selected for recovery. 
